Abstract-The Probabilistic Effectiveness Methodology (PEM) is
INTRODUCTION
A decade after the 9/11 attacks and more than a trillion dollars later, America still finds itself fighting the war on terror. Even though Bin Laden, the most wanted terrorist, was recently killed, as a nation we remain at risk for another major, potentially catastrophic event. Both, radiological and nuclear attacks pose some of the greatest threats to national security due to the severity of potential consequences. Since a key component in fighting nuclear terrorism is the ability to detect any smuggling of special nuclear material (SNM), radiological materials, and/or actual weapons, the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office has developed the Global Nuclear Detection Architecture (GNDA) designed to capture all security elements in the interdiction of a radiological or nuclear attack. To help with devising strategies and alternative defensive architectures, and supporting investment decisions in the different GNDA layers, Los Alamos National Laboratory is developing the Probabilistic Effectiveness Methodology (PEM) suite of tools for risk assessment of nuclear smuggling.
PEM computes for any set of plausible attack scenarios their respective interdiction probabilities by modeling all stages of nuclear smuggling; starting from a terrorist group's capabilities and its motivations and intentions, specific locations of SNM acquisition, transportation options for material recovery (if needed) and weaponization, and the final movement to a desired target. The calculation of the interdiction probability can include all, or only a subset of these stages, but at a minimum requires an origin and a target, description of the material or device being transported, and whether shielding is used or not.
Some of the important aspects of PEM include the use of a worldwide-multimodal transportation network, the current placement of inspection points and nuclear detectors at customs sites, border crossing points, and other natural checkpoint locations, like airports and seaports. The performance of the detection equipment depends upon the material or device being transported, its shielding, and devices attributes such as weight, volume, and brightness (signature). Other detection capabilities that are taken into account include both, random encounters with law enforcement while traveling along any path and potential encounters with law enforcement actively seeking the adversary anywhere on the network. In addition to a baseline architecture PEM includes a variety of alternative GNDA options, and allows recalculating the interdiction probability with one or several such architecture options. This paper is organized as follows. In section II we describe the individual PEM components. Section III provides some typical runs, including notional examples that illustrate support for the decision making process for GNDA problems. We conclude with an overall summary and some thoughts on the future work of PEM in section IV.
II. PEM STRUCTURE
PEM provides an end-to-end risk analysis of nuclear smuggling. It consists of four individual integrated components:
Scenarios for Weaponization, Acquisition, Movement, and Interdiction (SWAMI) is the overall integration tool that receives inputs from the other PEM modules to develop an overall probability of threat group success (risk) given a particular scenario -that scenario being composed of threat group, its motivations and capabilities, likely material or weapon, the available transportation network, and architecture performance;
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The Threat Service that accounts for both threat propensity (motivation and intent) and the group's capabilities, both technical and non-technical;
The Nuclear Detection Figures of Merit (NDFOM) tool, a web-served database that computes detection probabilities for unshielded and shielded nuclear sources by various detectors; and
The Pathways Analysis, Threat Response and Interdiction Options Tool (PATRIOT), the transportation model that portrays the multi-modal transportation network and identifies the most reliable path for smuggling nuclear material (or weapon) using detection data from NDFOM to help specify architecture performance. Figure 1 shows how the four PEM components are related. We next describe each of the components in more detail.
A. SWAMI
SWAMI is the overall model integration module that receives inputs from the Threat Service and from PATRIOT. SWAMI allows the evaluation of the effectiveness of given defensive architectures by testing thousands of different attack scenarios, and thereby developing, for each architecture, an overall probability of success. To calculate this probability it takes into account a terrorist group's characteristics, an architecture set of detectors' performance and deployment, weapons design data, and transportation on a world-wide multimodal network.
Each attack scenario requires at a minimum, the choice of a) a specific terrorist group that possesses a given set of capabilities (technical and non-technical) that in turn determine the likelihood of successfully manufacturing a particular device; b) geo-locations for the SNM/weapon acquisition, material recovery (if needed), a location for weaponization (also if needed), and the selection of an ultimate target; c) the device's shielding type in each of the transportation legs; and d) the adversary's most reliable paths to transport the device (SNM or weapon) between the origin, the recovery, the weaponization locations, and its final target. Other options for an attack can include material acquisition process (e.g. theft or a purchase through the black market), material quality, weapons design, etc. These most reliable paths and consequently, the corresponding probability of successfully transporting the device between two given points are provided by PATRIOT that is discussed in section D.
SWAMI obtains its basic input from another tool, the Extensible Logic Model (ELM) [8] . From ELM one constructs an attack model represented as a logic tree that specifies the key steps of a possible attack, and additionally where data is available their corresponding likelihoods. SWAMI allows the analyst to limit the number of possible paths through the tree to only those of interest, an ensemble of attacks that then are evaluated through its linkage to the Threat Service and PATRIOT (see Figure 2 above). We currently have two attack models using a nuclear device (ND) and a radiological dispersion device (RDD), from which a large set of attack ensembles can be constructed. These models only allow attacks that are consistent with the terrorist group's capabilities.
There are three basic steps to run SWAMI: i) load an attack model, ii) select or filter out the subset of attacks of interest by turning on/off each of the nodes on the corresponding ELM tree (see Figure 2) , and iii) select a terrorist group and a defensive architecture (described in more detail in section D). With these selections SWAMI develops an overall likelihood of success for each attack, and risk-orders the scenarios based on the likelihood of successful device manufacture, transport and delivery.
Other features of SWAMI include i) assigning a relative importance factor to the attacks accounting for diverse factors such as, our belief that an attacker possesses some technical capability, ii) the relative likelihood of being interdicted at a safe haven in one country versus another (for example, Yemen relative to Canada), or iii) the likelihood of acquiring various kinds and amounts of material in different countries such as Russia, Iran, or North Korea. 
B. Threat Service
The threat service keeps information of various terrorist groups and their scores for threat propensity (motivation and intent), and an overall score for capability that refers to the ability of the group to carry out a nuclear attack. The scores were created using a threat model that relates observable variables (that can be considered as uncertain evidence) to a prescribed collection of indicators that are required to determine the overall score of a given group characteristic, like threat propensity. Figure 3 shows a directed graph model of the relationships between observables, indicators, and warnings. One of the threat models in use, also developed at LANL, is called JIRGA [9] ; the name Jirga is derived from the Pashto Loya Jirga or "grand assembly," which is a historically-based meeting of tribal leaders in Afghanistan.
JIRGA is an indicators and warnings intelligence analysis software system that uses open-source and other inputs from various data sources and provides a framework for analyzing terrorist groups. It incorporates information such as the likelihood that a group will be able to develop a weapon on its own or would be able to acquire a weapon clandestinely. JIRGA monitors how the group's motivation, capabilities, and intent change over time. The latest analytical approach supporting JIRGA are Bayesian networks [5] , one for deriving the threat propensity score and another for the capability score. The dependencies between various indicators were determined using work from [1] . JIRGA allows an analyst to change the likelihoods of the various terrorist groups' characteristics to determine the threat propensity score.
The threat propensity score used in PEM depends directly on five variables (indicators) about the current state of the group, such as "Group wants to gain state status". These indicators in turn depend upon sets of observable variables (evidence), such as "Group is pushing for need of new political system", and whose likelihood is used to determine the overall threat propensity score. Figure 4 lists all the variables taken into account for the threat propensity score. Similarly, the overall capability score is based on a set of sixteen indicator variables that would allow a terrorist group to carry out a nuclear attack. Thirteen of these variables account for technical capabilities, and three refer to non-technical resources. All these indicators depend on various sets of observables.
C. NDFOM
The NDFOM (Nuclear Detection Figure- Of-Merit) tool computes how well a given detector will be able to detect a radiating source (material or weapon), under a specified engagement geometry. NDFOM makes use of detailed gamma and neutron spectra of various sources, as well as detailed detector response functions, generated by the Los Alamos package MCNPX 1 , a Monte Carlo radiation transport code for modeling the interaction of radiation with matter. It accounts for attenuation and buildup of radiation as it passes through shielding, the air, and structures that may be present. It convolves the radiated and transported spectral flux with the detector response function to obtain the count rate from the source and from background radiation. It applies a matched filter signal processing model to estimate the detector performance, allowing for the dynamics of the engagement, including changing distance and orientations.
NDFOM maintains a database of commercial radiation detection equipment, including personal radiation detectors (PRD), handheld radio-isotope identification devices (RIIDs), backpack radiation detection systems, and portal radiation monitors (PRM) that are available for use in the Global Nuclear Detection Architecture. Figure 5 shows an example of a radiation spectrum as computed with MCNP-X, showing the 1 keV resolution of the calculation. It is from raw data such as this that a final probability of detection is computed and subsequently used in PATRIOT under the architecture option specifications to help determine the attacker's likelihood of success. 
D. PATRIOT
PATRIOT represents the multi-modal transportation network and evaluates the probability that nuclear material or a weapon will be detected during transit. In [6] we provided a detail description of the general structure of PATRIOT, and focused on the theoretical framework to model the detection probabilities on different network components and the data sources used to estimate the model parameters. Here, we provide a brief description thereof, and present some of the "blue" and "perceived" architectures.
The main two components of PATRIOT are the physical multi-modal transportation network and the detection performance values for differing configurations of "blue" and "perceived" architectures.
1) The Physical Network:
The worldwide multi-modal transportation network consists of arcs and nodes representing each mode of transportation: road, rail, sea (containerized shipping), small sea craft, and air (commercial aviation); and three additional point layers to model special points of interest, such as monuments and nuclear facilities, and road and rail border crossings.
Some nodes function as terminal nodes that not only serve as common checkpoints, such as airports and seaports, which allow direct specification of detection capabilities, but also serve as natural points to connect all transportation layers to the road layer that is considered the base layer. All nodes, except the ones in the road transportation layer, are defined by default as terminal nodes, but any node can be transformed into a terminal node if needed. For example, airports are represented as terminals that connect the air network to the road network via layer connector arcs. PATRIOT automatically expands a terminal node into three nodes: the terminal, arrival gate, and departure gate nodes; and adds three directed arcs that connect them. Figure 6 depicts an expanded terminal node that connects to the road network. Finally, some terminal nodes have customs sites assigned. A custom node mirrors the structure of a terminal node and it is used to capture added delays and detection capabilities for the three arcs in a terminal node.
2) Reliabilities:
The second PATRIOT component is the set of all reliabilities (one minus the probability of being interdicted) that are assigned to the transportation network components, i.e. to the arcs and the terminal arcs. These arcs are used to calculate the reliability or the probability of successfully smuggling special nuclear material (or weapon) between the designated origin and target nodes. This is accomplished by multiplying the reliabilities associated to all the arcs that compose the most reliable path from the origin to the target by assuming that the network traversal is a Markov process. With this assumption, the overall reliability of a path consisting of n arcs is simply given by the product of the individual arc reliabilities.
There are three possible interdiction processes that can occur on the network. The first one refers to the process of being detected by either specific radiation detection equipment or by routine inspection procedures (non-radiation monitors) that occur in natural checkpoints such as airports and seaports, and border crossings. The performance of the detection equipment depends upon the device being transported and its shielding, and other device's attributes such as weight, volume and brightness (radiological signature). The other two detection processes include random encounters with law enforcement while traveling on any path and encounters with law enforcement actively seeking a threat anywhere on the network. Further, since we assume that these interdiction processes are mutually independent, the reliability of any arc is calculated as, (1-) where stands for the interdiction probability corresponding to the k-th interdiction process, and k is one of the N interdiction processes taking place on that arc, i.e. typically one of the three processes described previously, but any additional interdiction process can be taken into account by adding the corresponding to that arc.
To calculate the reliabilities of the individual arcs, each arc has several parameters assigned that allow computing the appropriate reliability according to the set of detection processes that occur. Formulas used to calculate the typical reliabilities of the different types of arcs are listed below: (a) intra-layer arcs, the arcs within each transportation layer, (b) extended arcs resulting from expanding terminal nodes (see Figure 6 ), referred to as terminal arcs, and (c) customs terminal arcs, arcs associated with the terminal nodes that have an associated customs site. Reliability for intra-layer arcs: Reliability for terminal arcs with customs sites: (3) where all parameters are defined as above but modified by the presence of a custom site.
Three points of note: First, if no extra detection or inspection resources are available on a specific arc, then the probability of detection p d is zero and the arc's reliability is not modified. This is the case for most intra-layer arcs. Second, the detection probability p d includes all possible sources of detection. In most cases this includes both, the baseline effectiveness or baseline detection that refers only to the detection capabilities in place, and the operational effectiveness that refers to how those capabilities are being operated; p d can include other factors, such as the encounter probability, which as the name suggests, refers to the chance of encountering the designed defensive measure. This term is used when a fixed number of detectors are assigned at random among a subset of arcs, a strategy that is used in some of the architecture options discussed later. Thus, in general we calculate the probability of detection as
Third, all parameter values (called performance values), in each of these formulas depend on the type of transportation mode layer. In general, the probability of detection p d has an added dependency on security level, detection capabilities and on the type of SNM/weapon being transported, which in turn includes factors such as weight, volume, signature, and shielding. Finally, parameter values referring to terminal arcs with customs sites are modified based upon their respective added detection capabilities.
3) Defensive Architectures and Performance Values:
All performance values depend upon the type of defensive architecture being employed. Implicit within architecture options are the selection of the terrorist group, which in turn determines the SNM or weapon, and the type of shielding. Explicit are three architecture options to enhance security levels abroad at some of the most important world-wide sea choke points, at Second Line of Defense inspection sites, and at pre-clearance airports. Additional architecture options add detection capabilities at Customs and Border Protection custom sites located in all five transportation mode layers (air, road, rail, sea, and small sea craft). In addition, four architecture options add detection capabilities in the interior layer, including deployment of equipment on road, at rail terminals, provisioning of rings around the cities, and along some natural barriers such as rivers. Most architecture options that refer to added security have at least three levels: current, representing the current equipment in place, enhanced, that produces a high detection probability (0.9), and lockdown that allows exploring alternative transportation modes by setting the detection probability to one. Recent added capabilities include a number of archictecture options that were constructed based on increased investment in specific technology deployed for specific transport modes. The equivalent of fifty million dollars served as the investment increment that was allowed for equipment purchase and deployment, and at times, additional resources for operations (for example, 24 hrs -7 days surge).
For example, one option might consider buying radioisotope identification devices (RIIDs) equipment and placing them on the deck of Coast Guard vessels; another might consider RPMs and placing them along specific choke points around a particular city (ring the city). Note that for each of these architecture options we used NDFOM to calculate the appropriate detection probabilities in formulas (1)-(3) that take into account the engagement scenario, and devices (SNM or weapons) weight, volume and signature strength.
For each combination of architecture option levels (we have over 1.2 billion such combinations!), PATRIOT computes the corresponding performance values for all network components and proceeds to find the maximum transit reliability (based on the adversary's perception of detection) over all possible paths via Dijsktra's algorithm [3] , [4] .
4) Perceived Reliabilities:
The latest additions to PATRIOT include first, the capability of being able to change any performance value anywhere on the network, and second, the capability of allowing any performance value to be randomly drawn from some probability distribution to account for the adversary's uncertainty. In this manner, each performance value (being a random variable) has a probability distribution assigned. PATRIOT can draw samples from such distributions (currently of sizes 1, 10, or 30), and for each set of realizations PATRIOT finds the most reliable path. Implemented distributions for all performance values are Gaussians, except for the detection probability p d that has a Beta distribution.
Finally, to tie PATRIOT to PEM, the reliability of the most likely pathway is reported back to SWAMI, which incorporates this information with information about the nature of the attack (such as acquisition, recovery, and assembly locations) to provide an overall attack risk measure.
III. EXAMPLES
We present three instances of how PEM can be used to provide different types of risk analysis for nuclear smuggling. The first example refers to resource allocation planning, the second illustrates how the smuggling risk changes depending on the device type and some of its characteristics, and the third illustrates the variation of the smuggling path using uncertain perceived reliabilities. Again, these examples reflect analysis based on our notional specifications of architecture option values.
A. Resource Allocation
For this study we constructed several defensive architectures that added detection capabilities based upon a nominal fifty million dollar investment within each of several selected GNDA layers. These added detection capabilities were made at selected locations (depending upon the specified architecture option of interest) including SLD inspection sites, U.S. points of entry (POE) by tranportation mode (air, rail, road, and sea), and various locations within the interior layer, such as pagers at rail terminals, detection equipment for law enforcement vehicles, on rings around the largest U.S. cities, and along various natural barriers. The attack scenarios used to evaluate the performance of each architecture option specified a single Russian location for the acquisition of SNM, three possible SNM that resulted in four different types of devices (weapons), six different locations for material recovery and device assembly (when needed), and final transportation of the device (shielded or unshielded) to one of nine different U.S. target cities for a total of 1,008 possible attacks. For each of these attacks, PEM computed the risk by first using the current level of detection for all architecture options, i.e. the baseline case, and then by evaluating each architecture options (nominal $50 million additional investment) one at a time. The interdiction probability for each set of runs, is summarized using a boxplot (see Figure 7) . A boxplot is a representation of the empirical distribution where the upper and lower ends of the box indicate the 75 and 25 percentiles respectively, and the line in the middle of the box represents the median. The length of the box is the inter-quartile range (IQR), i.e. the 75 percentile minus the 25 percentile. The end of the whiskers represent the maximum and minimum observations, unless at least one of the observations lies beyond on of the ends of the box plus/minus 1.5 times the IQR, in which case those points are considered outliers and are represented with small circles. Figure 5 compares the performance of each fifty million dollar investment in the different architecture options (transport layers). As can be observed, some investments have no or little effect, but some others make a significant improvement, particularly adding detectors to the Small Sea Craft layer (SSC) represented by the dark red boxplot. Other results include how placing the same detectors in different layers and how the same investment level in the same layer using different detectors both produce different effects.
B. Smuggling routes and their risk are device dependent
For this example we assume that each U.S. state deploys a different number of personal radiation detectors (PRD or pagers) on law enforcement vehicles, and we adjusted the mean detection distance (λ) in formula (1) appropriately. Table  1 lists four devices/weapons with their relative values for weight, volume and signature brightness, with the last column listing the smuggler's detection probability while traveling from Canada to Washington, D.C. using two different defensive architectures. For each device, Figure 8 shows an attacker's route using the current GNDA notional settings. Note that devices 1-3 travel by road (yellow route) to Puget Sound, take a small sea craft vessel to cross the border and arrive at a tier 1 seaport (seaports are classfied into three tiers according to size/traffic). Devices 1 and 2 return to road and travel the shortest path all the way to Wahington, D.C. Device 3, a greater signature device, than either device 1 and 2, also travels on the road network, but makes a detour through Ohio to avoid the now additional pagers in Virginia. Note that pagers cannot detect device 1 or 2, because of their lower signature strength. Finally, device 4, a much lighter weapon, travels on rail, transfers to road to cross the AmericanCanadian border, hops again to rail, then to small sea craft, and back to rail. Although seemingly irrational, the number of hops reflects the varying level of detection probabilities among the transport modes and geographic locations.
In contrast, adding detection capabilities to tier 1 seaports (see Figure 9 ), shifts the most reliable paths for devices 1-3 first to the road network crossing Canada to Halifax, and then transport to enter the U.S. through either a tier 2 or 3 seaport on the East Coast (bright blue routes). Finally, device 4 having a different signature and weight, travels directly to Washington, D.C. by air (red route), with a corresponding increase in detection probability.
C. Perceived Reliabilities
Figure 10 displays ten different routes obtained using an adversary's perceived reliabilities.
Samples for the performance values (see equations (1)-(3)) were drawn from the Beta distributions for the detection probability p d , and from the Gaussian distribution for all other parameters. All distributions have mean µ equal to the baseline performance value (values used for the deterministic case), and variance for either a Gaussian or Beta distribution as appropriate.
IV. CONCLUSION
PEM is an end-to-end modeling approach for the risk assessment of nuclear smuggling. We presented the four PEM components: SWAMI, the Threat Service, NDFOM, and PATRIOT, and taken together provide insight into differing GNDA issues, e.g. overall risk of a particular attack, effectiveness of a given "blue" architecture, whether assuming an adversary with either perfect or uncertain knowledge, or performing a resource allocation study. Overall PEM is a flexible tool that allows the analysis of hundreds of thousands of scenarios at a time, the comparison of diverse architectures and investment strategies, providing the analyst with the ability to examine the effects of uncertainty for both the threat adversary and the defensive response. Future work includes improved computational efficiency (larger attack ensembles and architecture options), additional transport modes (inland waterways, general aviation), and enhanced user interface features. 
